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Summary 
Th e article presents the current situation in Iceland. It outlines its economic back-
ground and the causes of the past crisis. It also presents how it was overcome as well as 
what measures have been taken to avoid further breakdowns, as well as what conclusions 
resulted from it. Moreover, it indicates Island’s main advantages and draws attention to 
the weaknesses and potential sources of the next crises, as well as the importance of having 
its own currency for the restructuring process. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, Iceland has been the center of attention due to the crisis and 
the speed with which it overcame it. Th e pace and depth of the changes made Iceland a 
model country to others, such as Greece or Spain. Th erefore, it is worth taking a closer 
look at its current situation and analyze the opportunities and threats for its further 
development.
Th e aim of the article is to present the current situation in Iceland and the sources 
of successfully overcoming the crisis, as well as to analyze the opportunities for further 
economic development, and draw attention to the possible risks and potential sources of 
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further breakdowns. Th ere is no academic literature on this subject, only short articles 
and statistical data referred to in this text are available. In the light of the above, descrip-
tive analysis was adopted as the research method.
2. STYLIZED FACTS 
Th e economy of Iceland started to develop very quickly aft er a sharp downturn 
in 2008. According to Th e World Competitiveness Yearbook 2016 (IMD, 2016), Iceland 
was ranked 23rd in the world and 12th in Europe among the most competitive econo-
mies. Table 1 shows the current economic situation of Iceland.
Table 1: Economic situation of Iceland (selected years 2008-2015, 2016 - forecast)
2008 2010 2011 2013 2014 2015 2016*
GDP (bln ISK) 1551 1620 1702 1891 2006 2214 2309
GDP growth rate (%) 1.5 -3.6 2 4.4 1.9 4.2 4.3
Infl ation (%) 12.8 7.5 4.2 6 4.1 2 2.2
Unemployment rate (%) 3 7.6 7.1 5.4 4.9 3.4 3.4
Average employment in tourism (% 
of employed)
5.6 6.7 7.9 9.2 10 12.1 15
Employment in sectors (%):
Agriculture
5 6 6 5 5 - -
fi shing 2 3 3 2 2 - -
industry 22 18 18 19 18 - -
services (total) 73 76 76 77 77 - -
Budget defi cit/surplus (bln ISK) -202 -158 -95 -34.8 -1.2 -18.4 -
 Budget defi cit (% GDP) -13.1 -9.8 -5.6 -1.9 -0.1 -0.8 -
External trade balance (bln ISK) -6.7 120.2 97.1 40.2 4.3 -30.6 -
Total export (bln ISK) 2724.8 3581.1 3887.8 3969.3 3703.5 4173.9 -
Export (bln ISK): industrial products 243.2 311 335.5 309.1 310 331.1 -
marine products 171.4 220.5 251.6 272.5 244 264.6 -
Incomes by tourism - 163 197 277 305 370 -
*data for 8 months
Source: own calculation on the basis of data from http://www.statice.is/, 22.10.2016
 
A positive growth rate, evident since 2011 (aft er the breakdown in years 2009-2010) 
is mainly a result of high government expenditure, although household expenditure has 
also grown slowly. Th e unemployment rate - always low - aft er a short period of growth 
during the deepest crisis, has declined again and is expected to fall to a sustainable level 
below 3%. Iceland has again become a country with a net infl ow of immigrants (Icelandic 
economic situation, 2015, pp. 3-14), who are mostly employed in the tourism sector.
Iceland is ranked 20th in the global ranking of economic freedom according 
to the Heritage Foundation, and 10th in Europe. It has got one of the best systems of 
protection of property rights, low corruption and high economic freedom. Tax reve-
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nue amounts to 35.5% of budget revenue while government expenditure has declined, 
constituting 43.9% of national expenditure. In 2015, public debt reached 80% of GDP 
(Heritage, 2016).
 Th erefore, it can be seen that aft er deep recession which reached bottom in 
2011, the country is developing quickly. Th ese positive changes are, among others, the 
result of a good use of loans obtained from IMF, the Nordic countries, Russia and Po-
land2 . Th e recovery program, a 6-year smooth path of cutting budget defi cit (Kozieł, 
2016), was introduced in November 2008 and completed in August 2011. Th anks to the 
conducted activities Iceland managed to repay its loans before the due date - until au-
tumn 2015 (Guðmundsson, 2016). In the same year Iceland was also the fi rst country to 
reach and exceed the pre-crisis level of economic development.
3. CHANGES IN ECONOMY 
Th e crisis caused major changes in the economy of Iceland. First, overheating of 
the economy stemmed from overinvestment in the energy sector developed mainly for 
the purposes of the aluminum industry (one should remember that Iceland has a poorly 
diversifi ed structure of creating GDP – one of the main sources of income is fi shing and 
industries associated with it, and this sector is very sensitive to economic fl uctuations). 
It happened that the production of aluminum only was not essential, it was the con-
struction that mattered, generating employment and constituting the main source of 
economic development. Second, previous reforms enabled the creation of fi nancial bub-
bles and a threefold increase in prices on the real estate market (Sutowski, 2010, p.139), 
which was connected with an easy access to loans. Th e collapse of three large banks 
changed the situation dramatically - further rapid growth turned out to be impossible, 
debts of banks exceeded almost tenfold the value of GDP.
Th e costs of the crisis were high – they included a loss of approximately 20-25% of 
GDP. Th e IMF estimates were higher and amounted to 40%. Net costs of fi scal support 
and restructuring of domestic banks amounted to 19.2% of GDP (Davíðsdóttir’s, 2015).
 Problems which aff ected Icelanders came as a shock to them. Th ey oft en did 
not have any savings, were accustomed to living with loans, so they could not cope at 
the moment of loss of their sources of income. Some of them emigrated and looked for 
work abroad, mainly in the Nordic countries. Apart from a rise in unemployment, the 
tax rate also increased (Budyta-Budzyńska, 2016, p.115) (although the tax revenue share 
in GDP fell from 17.6% in 2007 to 12.1% in 2009, and in subsequent years was slightly 
above 13%) (statice.is, 2016), while salaries remained unchanged. Th e level of consump-
tion decreased, caused by the necessity to make savings.
 In the face of these problems the authorities took radical action. Banks were 
allowed to collapse. It was decided (despite the pressure) not to repay debts to foreign 
creditors. People responsible for committing fi nancial crimes were punished. Th e de-
2  Poland lent 214 million dollars to Iceland, from Polska udzieli… ,2008.
136
POSLOVNA IZVRSNOST ZAGREB, GOD. XI (2017) BR. 2 Symanik E.: Iceland After the Crisis – Opportunities and Threats for Development
valuation of the Icelandic króna (by 70%) turned out to be a success that triggered infl ation, 
which in 2009 amounted to 18% per year (Islandzki cud…, 2012). Th is led to a freeze in 
salary increase. Th e government changed its focus from the banking sector to traditional 
industries, such as fi shing and tourism, and this change was helped by a decline in the value 
of the currency. Depositors were assured they would receive their bank deposits, national 
entities were granted reliefs in repaying existing loans, and the public expenditure was cut. 
Th e devaluation of the currency helped to keep salaries at almost the same level, 
which saved household expenditure from a drastic decrease, even though the króna was 
worth less. Th is also led to an increase in export revenue (Matsangou, 2015, and Katsi-
mi, Zoega, 2015). Th anks to this, the economy started to develop.
Th e authorities also drew conclusions about the causes and ways of avoiding sim-
ilar breakdowns of the economy in the future. At the request of the Prime Minister of 
Iceland, a report was created indicating that the main source of the country’s problems 
was the ease of excessive creation of money by commercial banks. Conclusions of the 
report show how to change this without disrupting the functioning of the entire bank-
ing system (a sovereign money system should serve this purpose, in which the entire 
possibility of money creation would belong exclusively to a central bank, and not like 
today – also to commercial banks) (Reforma monetarna, 2015). 
A factor certainly contributing to development was the use of an unusual solu-
tion: rescuing its own economy by refusing to repay debts to foreign countries. Th e coun-
try was exposed to retaliatory actions by the United Kingdom (application of the Count-
er-terrorism Act and weakening of Island’s military security by abolishing air patrols 
performed by the British forces, which was contested in front of NATO). It turned out, 
however, that such actions proved to be eff ective – the country developed very quickly.
Although in the end the government withdrew its application for accession to 
the EU (in March 2016), Iceland uses the conveniences of the European integration in 
a selective way - it belongs to the European Economic Area and the Schengen area, and 
this fact has ensured the free movement of people, capital and goods, which promotes 
development (it adopted 18% of the regulations of the Union in order to make sure these 
freedoms were provided). Despite a severe currency crisis, the króna was not replaced by 
the Euro, and the country therefore continues to control its banking system and plans 
the above-mentioned fi nancial reforms to avoid similar breakdowns in the future. In 
addition, the procedure of abolishing control of capital movement is ongoing (from 17 
August 2016 it is again possible to acquire property abroad and fi nancial instruments 
denominated in foreign currencies) (Iceland Economic…, 2016).
Th e collapse of the króna also contributed to an improvement of competitiveness 
of the economy. A great infl ow of tourists took place aft er 2010, mainly from the Unit-
ed Kingdom, for whom holidays in the Land of Ice and Fire have become exotic – and 
cheaper. Iceland has become trendy and well-known because of the crisis. Iceland ap-
peared in the global media and attracted public attention. In addition, the combination 
of the results of the Polish presidential plane crash in Smoleńsk and the eruption of 
Eyjafl allajökull, making global air traffi  c impossible for over 2 weeks, unintentionally 
assured free publicity to Iceland.
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Icelanders made a good use of the infl ow of tourists. New accommodations, ca-
fes, restaurants, unusual museums appeared (e.g. Museum of Rock’n’Roll). A network 
of bus connections was developed enabling the exploration of many attractive and dif-
fi cult to reach places by using public transport operating during the summer, with long 
stops to sightsee the surroundings. In addition, a widely developed system of campsites 
and mountain shelters, the mountain rescue service and the tourist information service 
function smoothly.3
Figure 1: Th e number of employees in tourism sector - changes in relation 
to the previous year (monthly, in percentage) in years 2009 – 2016
Source: on the basis of data from http://www.statice.is/, 22.10.2016
 
Although the economic collapse initially caused a turn towards the development 
of traditional sectors (fi shing, tourism, aluminum production), there was, however, a 
dynamic shift  towards the use and sale of renewable energy and the development of 
information technology (Shipman, 2016). Th ere are plans to eliminate fossil fuels and 
replace them with hydrogen as the main fuel within 30-40 years. Yet, this does not pre-
vent conducting oil exploration in the maritime zone of Iceland.
Th ere are also threats. Th e Euler Hermes report from 2015 (Euler Hermes, 2015) 
indicates that a still disadvantageous structure of the economy, high public debt and 
external debt (up to 550% of GDP) and a poorly protected banking sector are the weak-
nesses of the country. Th e exchange rate and risk of infl ation are monitored but the 
threat of the collapse has not disappeared, despite the low energy prices and the ap-
preciation of the króna. A slight increase in the nominal salary supported a growth of 
infl ation expectations. In addition, sudden and large capital fl ows may lead to short-
term disequilibrium and exchange rate volatility, putting pressure on the balance of 
payments. Th is can be fostered by the liquidation of tax on withdrawn funds (amount-
ing to 39%) in June 2015 (introduced in 2009) (Amadeo, 2016), the aim of which was to 
prevent rapid outfl ow of foreign capital.
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Other threats result from a large share of traditional sectors still present in the 
economy. Fishing generates about 11% of GDP. Fish are, however, a source of income 
subject to many limitations, not allowing any control of supply or value. Tourism, the 
importance of which has increased greatly in recent years [in 2014 its total share in 
GDP, including its impact on other sectors of the economy, amounted to 23.3% and is 
expected to grow (Travel & Tourism…, 2015, p3)], is also not free from disadvantages. 
One of them is the lack of ability to provide cheap meals for mass tourism (which is 
dominant). Th erefore, the costs of food will grow which, combined with high prices for 
accommodation, will neutralize the positive eff ect of the devaluation of the króna, and 
naturally limit the infl ow of visitors. It addition, it will make Iceland an exclusive tourist 
destination, where high prices play a minor role. Th e country is heavily dependent on 
oil, with fi shing as its largest consumer. Moreover, the vast majority of products is im-
ported. While oil prices were low, which was refl ected on transport costs, the economy 
developed rapidly, which accelerated the process of overcoming the crisis. It is diffi  cult 
to predict what the situation will look like in the future.
It is worth remembering that both the implemented reforms and the speed with 
which they were carried out, as well as their high effi  ciency, were also the result of spe-
cifi c characteristics of the discussed economy. Iceland is a small country, its residents 
are disciplined and have a high civil awareness. Because of this, and because of favorable 
external circumstances, as well as the subordination to recovery rules recommended by 
the IMF, the country managed to overcome the collapse quickly.
4. CONCLUSIONS 
It is possible to draw some conclusions on the basis of the analysis of the available 
data. First of all, one of the important factors which contributed to the improvement of 
the situation of Iceland is a signifi cant development of tourism. Th ere was a very unusu-
al contributing factor that had a positive impact on the tourist industry – the movies 
which were produced on the island (e.g. “Game of Th rones”). Th is means that another 
sector which might become a driving force of the economy is the sector of artistic cre-
ation (in 2012, more than 7 thousand companies were registered in this sector) (Islandz-
ki cud…, 2012). It is worth noticing that the previously mentioned Heritage Foundation 
Report highlights signifi cant facilitations for development of small enterprises within 
the existing regulation, with an emphasis on the use of environmentally friendly tech-
nologies and renewable sources of energy. Th is is also supported by a high transparency 
of the legal and economic system and a lack of corruption.
Iceland took advantage of its unusual competitive advantages: the activity of 
volcanoes (the eruption of Eyjafj allajökull aroused interest and attracted tourists), geo-
thermal energy (to heat homes and greenhouses), and hydropower stations (aluminum 
production, server rooms). Global interest in this small country has increased, conse-
quently infl uencing the infl ow of fi nancial resources from tourism and industry. Since 
there is a tradition of education in the humanities in the country, as well as a common 
knowledge of English, the country was not surprised by the wave of globalization and 
has been able to take advantage of the sudden increase in interest.
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It is estimated that in 2016 income from tourism will constitute 10% of GDP 
(Tourism to bring…, 2016). It is worth noticing that even though the majority of tour-
ists comes during the summer, the country is not empty in the winter – observing the 
aurora constitutes a major attraction (hotels in Reykjavik are fully booked especially in 
February) (Khan, 2016).
However, the disadvantages of the applied solutions have become evident. Th e 
private sector still has problems with getting funds for the development of companies, 
although the abolition of restrictions should change this. Th e low value of the króna 
does not mean that the country is low-priced – ISK 1000 is the basic unit of account, 
which makes costs of accommodation very high for an average visitor from abroad. De-
spite this, in the fi rst half of 2016, tourist expenditure amounted to ISK 26 billion (USD 
212 million) (Iceland rises...2016), which might be connected with a signifi cant increase 
in accommodation prices – by 38% since 2013 (Iceland hotel…, 2016).
Th e infl ow of tourists is intense - it is estimated that in 2016 it will be more than 
1 700 000 people . Th is is over fi ve times more than the entire population of the coun-
try. On the one hand, this will lead to an increase in revenue, but on the other hand, it 
also means threats. Th e fi rst threat is the development of accommodation – there are 
concerns that taking loans for new apartments that would be rented to tourists for short 
stays (e.g. by Airbnb website), will in a short time lead to a growth of another speculative 
bubble, this time generated by the real estate market (Landsbanki’s forecast estimates 
that property prices will rise further by 25% in 2017) (Hayman, 2016). Th e increase in 
prices of accommodation will not last forever. Another threat is the burden to the natu-
ral environment caused by such a high number of visitors. Despite stringent regulations 
regarding environmental protection and rules on behavior in protected sites, not every-
body obeys them (Poles are leaders in this shameful area), which may in the short term 
destroy the main magnet for tourists – Island’s beautiful nature. It is therefore possible 
that the authorities will soon implement various limitations that will restrict the free-
dom of movement of tourists, especially individual ones which are very numerous (if 
not the majority), for example by strictly limiting the number of cars to rent or the num-
ber of daily visits to national parks. Moreover, jobs in the tourism sector do not require 
higher education, with the consequence that salaries are also not very high. Th erefore, 
more and more foreigners work in this sector. During the crisis, educated Icelanders de-
cided to emigrate temporarily or started their own business (How did Iceland…, 2016). 
Th e latter might become an additional driving force for the economy provided that they 
start IT companies. However, there is no doubt that a wider diversifi cation of the eco-
nomic base is needed.
Th e quick exit from the crisis was infl uenced by the fact that Iceland has its own 
currency. Th is enabled the local government to use an additional tool: control of the 
exchange rate. It is therefore possible to draw an important conclusion for both coun-
tries wishing to enter the Eurozone, as well as for the ones comprising it: one should not 
hurry with monetary integration. Economies must be very similar to each other, have a 
similar force of external impact and work together for a long time, in diff erent phases of 
the business cycle (testing development possibilities and reacting to problems on their 
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own and their partner’s side) to make sure that the introduction of the common curren-
cy would not cause breakdowns and diffi  culties, as was the case in Greece. It is possible 
that deepening of cooperation in regions might support such integration.
In conclusion, it is worth observing further what is happening in the North of 
Europe – small Iceland can still teach us a lot.
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ISLAND NAKON KRIZE 
– PRILIKE I PRIJETNJE RAZVOJU*
Ewa Szymanik 4 
Sažetak
Članak predstavlja trenutno stanje na Islandu. Daje naznake gospodarske pozadi-
ne i uzroka krize. Također opisuje kako je ona prevladana te koje su mjere poduzete kako 
bi se izbjegli daljnji potresi, kao i koje se pouke mogu izvući iz nje. Nadalje, ukazuje na 
glavne prednosti Islanda i skreće pozornost na slabosti i moguće izvore sljedeće krize, kao 
i na važnost postojanja vlastite valute za proces restrukturiranja.
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